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ABSTRACT
The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined
objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the
dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which
there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources
including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to
solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from
an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious
divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the
procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities
for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective
goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and
the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such
as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present
decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory
are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually
help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and
tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods
could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The
paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the
incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only
more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by
conventional economic analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to consider the problems arising in the management of natural resources
and the environment it is first necessary, to describe the various types of goods involved in
economic terms. The classification presented in section 2 starts from the classical
divergence between private and collective goods and it is expanded with new concepts that
give rise to new types of goods such as, for example, the ones that we call subprivate
goods, hypercollective goods, and intergenerational goods. The conceptual framework is
therefore enhanced and the conditions for a rigorous analysis are improved. It is also
necessary to refine the conceptual basis provided by economic theory on externalities in
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2order to analyze not only the classical divergences between individual and collective
interest, but also the opportunities for action in a non-ideal context. These questions are
considered in section 3 and the conflict that exists between present and future generations is
analyzed in detail, from the perspectives of both equity and efficiency.
Conventional methods of economic evaluation of projects and policies are usually
used to help decision-makers. The application of these methods to intergenerational
problems, such as climate change, has been widely criticized because it does not take the
interests of future generations into consideration adequately. Section 4 analyzes the
limitations of conventional analysis of intergenerational problems and proposes an
alternative solution which incorporates the existence of different generations and the
requirement of sustainability in long-term projects. Section 5 studies an intergenerational
weighting showing social preferences, and proposes an evaluation methodology which
aggregates the costs and benefits of projects through this weighting. Section 6 analyzes the
individual and social optimality of intergenerational investments from an individual and
social point of view using an overlapping generations model with intergenerational
altruism. Finally, section 7 summarizes the main conclusions.
2. COLLECTIVE GOODS AND OTHER PECULIARITIES
2.1 Definitions and classifications
The notion of collective good emerged as a response to a legal action against
Thomas Jefferson for using the idea of a mechanism that was patented. The first example of
collective good was therefore an idea. Jefferson argued that one should not pay for the use
of an idea because “its peculiar characteristic is that nobody possesses less of it due to the
fact that another posses it completely”, i.e. because there is no any opportunity cost for
anybody. The economic definition of collective good comes from Samuelson (1954). It is
opposite to that of private good because of its consumption characteristics and it has no
relationship with the type of ownership of the good. For a good to be collective, it does not
matter whether the ownership is public, private or mixed.
In a private good, such as apples or tissues, there is rivalry in its consumption
because if a unit is consumed, the total availability for consumption diminishes in this unit.
However, in the case of a good with collective good characteristics, such as the protection
provided by the ozone layer, all consumers consume the same amount — all the available
quantity. It is obvious that the environment and natural resources clearly have collective
good characteristics.
In a pure collective good, consumption is unavoidable, the cost of access is zero,
and there is no possibility of excluding any consumer. This creates serious problems for
financing the provision of this type of goods. In fact, given that nobody can be excluded
from its consumption, even if they have not contributed at all to financing the provision of
the good, there are no incentives for contributing to financing the provision of the good,
which is known as free rider behavior. The same problem arises when the aim is to
discover a consumer’s valuation of the good. The individual will tend to undervalue
(overvalue) the good if he/she thinks that his/her fiscal contribution will be greater
(smaller) as greater (smaller) is the valuation stated. A prior requirement for efficient
provision is knowledge of the good’s economic value, the demand curve. As a
consequence, in order to achieve an optimal provision, a demand revelation mechanism
3should be used, i.e., a procedure that induces consumers to tell the truth in their own
interest.
Local collective goods
Goods that have collective good characteristics for only a subset of consumers and
not for all of them are called local collective goods. These goods behave as pure collective
goods within their range and as pure private goods between different ranges, such as the
services that provide the clock of a church tower.
Hypercollective goods
If one good is a collective good, the incorporation of an additional consumer does
not affect consumption by other consumers. This study proposes calling goods whose
available consumption increases when the number of consumers increases hypercollective
goods. The utility obtained from the consumption of discotheques depends on the quantity
of consumers. The same happens in certain types of associations, unions, political parties
and groups of persons with similar preferences on specific issues, which provide the
relational goods defined in Uhlaner (1989) –because the utility of each member increases
with the total number of them.
Congestion. All goods with collective good characteristics can be affected by congestion.
This means that when the quantity of consumers increases above a certain critical threshold,
it is necessary to increase production in order to keep the characteristics of the good
unchanged. For example, when a bus is full, it is necessary to use another bus to satisfy an
additional user of this local collective good. Furthermore, in order to maintain the quality of
a hypercollective good such as the Internet, it is necessary to enlarge its capacity when a
congestion threshold is achieved.
Subprivate goods
In a private good, a unit consumed reduces the total quantity available for posterior
consumption by exactly this unit. We propose calling those goods whose available
consumption decreases by more than one unit when a unit is consumed subprivate goods.
The typical example is the use of the urban underground system by networks of collective
services – see Pasqual and Riera (2004) - given that the space actually occupied is much
lower than the total space disabled for other uses. Furthermore, depending on the fishing
technique employed, for each ton of fish captured useful for human consumption there is a
loss of much more tons of marine life. In order to consume one actual unit, it is necessary to
produce K units (K > 1) of the subprivate good. Consumption efficiency (K) can be
measured by observing how the total quantity available for consumption falls as a
consequence of the actual consumption of a unit of good:
K = - D available quantity /D consumed units
The goods can be characterized, according to the degree of their private/collective
characteristic, using the K factor of efficiency in consumption:
Reduction in available quantity = K·(quantity consumed)
4The values of K for each type of the characterized goods are:
Type of good K value
subprivate K > 1
pure private K = 1
local collective 0 < K < 1
pure collective K = 0
local hypercollective K < 0
hypercollective K < 0
Durable goods
A good is durable if it is not exhausted in only one act of consumption, when
continuous use during a certain time period is possible and the various consumption acts
take place before there is an appreciable deterioration of its basic characteristics. The
characteristic of durable good is compatible with that of private goods – such as ties and
lighters - and with that of collective goods – such as the force of gravity, the English
language and the theorem of the inverse function. Unlike durable goods, non-durable goods
are those goods whose consumption leads to the immediate destruction of the good, such as
peanuts. A distinction should be made between those that are recyclable and those that not.
A can of beer can be recycled, i.e., the material can be reclaimed at a certain cost. However,
the use of oil as fuel completely destroys it for economic purposes, with no possibility of
recycling it.
Intergenerational goods
An especially interesting case of a durable good is all those goods with a duration of
two or more generations, and those of unlimited duration in particular. For these types of
goods, we suggest the name of intergenerational goods. The set of goods that constitute a
culture and renewable goods are typical cases, not only of collective goods, but also of
intergenerational goods, given that their benefits can be extended to an unlimited quantity
of generations.
Intergenerational collective goods
Extending the definition of collective good to the intergenerational level, we obtain
intergenerational collective goods, which are characterized by the feature that consumption
by one generation does not at all limit consumption by the following generations. As a
consequence, these goods are by definition sustainable. The characteristics of
intergenerational collective goods are compatible with those of collective goods, local
collective goods, private goods and any others within one generation. For instance, a jewel
is a pure private good, a microclimate is a local collective good, the ozone layer is a pure
collective good and Internet is a hypercollective good, but all of them are intergenerational
collective goods.
5Renewable goods
A good is renewable, in the strict sense, when it is possible to have at one’s disposal
a certain minimum quantity of the resource for an unlimited time, with no need for human
intervention because there is an automatic regulation of incomes and outcomes. The water
of an aquifer, fishing resources, forests, and the stork population are examples of renewable
goods. Logically, the characteristic of renewability does not entail the characteristic of
indestructibility - it is easy to overexploit a forest or an aquifer for a short space of time or
to annihilate the storks, destroying these flows of wealth forever. If biological goods are
consumed at under their reproduction rate, the total available good for the future does not
diminish because the mass recovers quick and automatically. However, the overexploitation
of this type of resources entails the reduction of the quantity available for the future, and in
extreme cases, the destruction of the resource. The non-biological ones, also named
environmental goods, such as air, ozone layer, or oceans, do not reproduce and have a
limited capacity for autoregeneration. If use does not surpass the limit of autoregeneration
they could be used indefinitely as if they were free goods (goods whose opportunity cost is
zero), while the result of overexploiting them is the continuous loss of quality.
Transformable goods
Here we propose calling those goods where it is possible to change or modify their
subprivate, private, collective, hypercollective, intergenerational, durable or non-durable
characteristic transformable goods. A natural space is a local collective good but it can be
used as if it were a pure private good if access is restricted to one person only. An art
collection can be consumed as a collective good if it can be observed by any consumer, as a
private good if it can only be enjoyed by its owner, and as a subprivate if it rests forgotten
in the basement of a museum. The degree of transformation is reflected in the modification
of the K factor of consumption efficiency. In addition, the duration of the goods is also
transformable in general. It is as possible to ensure the survival of species that would
disappear without human intervention as to irreversibly destroy a renewable good. There
are multiple intermediate possibilities because the duration of a good can be modified in
one or more periods. The duration of manufactured goods is a control variable for the
maximization of private benefits by the producer, the chosen duration is systematically
lower than the optimal2 (planned obsolescence) and entails important external costs due to
the increase in the use of materials and the generation of residuals. Increasing the duration
of a manufactured product constitutes then a good measure of environmental policy,
because the greater the useful life of one good, the lower the use of materials and the
quantity of residuals produced. A mild transformation of the characteristics of a collective
good, in order to make it less pure, has its advantages. An example is the restriction of the
access to a natural park, which may be a necessary measure for the preservation of this
space. In other cases, it is useful to remove the characteristic of non-exclusion in order to
make private provision of a collective good feasible, and thus avoid the possible financial
constraints of the public sector.
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62.2. A practical case of optimal provision of collective goods: an insurance of water
availability
There are many ways to analyze “water” from an economic perspective. Initially,
water can be seen as a raw material good, a renewable natural resource that is contained in
multiple deposit sites. Economically, human beings derive welfare from the use of water,
either as an input in the production of goods and services, or through its final consumption.
Usually, water with economic value has to be stored, transported, treated, or evacuated with
some additional treatment. Often, all of the above are required at the same time. One way to
increase the amount of economically usable water is to reuse it.
Since water is a useful resource (it provides welfare), it will be more valuable as it
becomes scarcer. Prices should therefore reflect the relative scarcity of the resource as an
economic good. Again, there is the possibility of increasing the amount of economic water
in a given system, by enlarging the storage capacity or accessing new deposits, by
extending the transportation infrastructure, by de-salting sea water, or by extending the life
cycle of the economic water, for instance. The life cycle can be extended by re-using water,
after treatment, for higher economic value activities (e.g. agricultural use) than the water
would otherwise have been used for (e.g. returning it to a river ecosystem). “Producing”
more water implies an extra cost, but also an extra benefit. A cost-benefit analysis could
evaluate whether the extra benefit is worth the extra cost or not. To do so, the value of
water – its shadow price - has to be approximated. This chapter deals mostly with the
problem of how to estimate this water value and how to implement a cost-benefit analysis
of water reuse.
2.2.1. A naïf model
Given people’s preferences and resources, the quantity demanded of good x, e.g.
water, depends on its price p. The direct demand function is therefore x = X(p). The price is
used as a value signal and ought to coincide with the marginal cost. If p were not
appropriate, the value signal would be biased and the amount of the good x provided would
not be optimal. Instead of using the direct one, the indirect demand function could also be
used, p = P(x).  The function P(x) expresses the maximum price p the consumer would be
willing to pay for an additional unit of water, if this is the good under consideration. In
other words, P(x) measures the marginal valuation of water by the consumer.
As an example, consider the demand schedule in table 1. If consumption were of 2
units of water, the (gross) social benefit would be 25 (19 monetary units for the first unit of
water, and 6 for the second), while with 3 or more units the (gross) benefit would always be
28 monetary units.
Table 1. Actual marginal value per unit of water consumed
Physical units 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Marginal valuation 19 6 3 0
Let us now suppose that the cost of providing water is that shown in table 2. With
the data shown in both tables, the optimal consumption – the one that maximizes the (net)
social benefit - is 3 units. The net benefit, or surplus, associated with the 3 units of water is
E* = (19 + 6 + 3) – (1 + 1 + 2) = 24 monetary units.
7Table 2. Marginal cost per unit of water consumed
Physical units 1st 2nd 3rd 4th ... Tth
Marginal cost 1 1 2 2 2 2
The result is the same as the one which would arise from a perfectly competitive
market, in the absence of externalities, collective goods and increasing economies of scale.
But the availability of water for consumption has collective good characteristics, and it is
therefore susceptible to the free-rider problem. To illustrate this point, imagine that
consumers understate their interest in the good. Instead of revealing the true demand
schedule (table 1), they send signals according to table 3. With the cost schedule from table
2, the new “optimal” provision of water would be 2 units, since it is the amount that
maximizes the social surplus E* = (19 + 6) – (1 + 1) = 23 monetary units. There would
therefore be a loss of welfare associated with the understated signals.
Table 3. Understated marginal value per unit of water consumed
Physical units 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Biased statement (-) 12 5 1 0
If instead of understating their interest, consumers overstate it, the solution is again
not optimal. To illustrate this, consider the new schedule in table 4. Now the “optimal”
consumption would be 5 units of water, since this is the amount that produces the
maximum surplus E* = (19 + 6 + 3) – (1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 2) = 20 monetary units. In
conclusion, to achieve an optimal assignation of water, the free-rider problem has to be
avoided.
Table 4. Overstated marginal value per unit of water consumed
Physical units 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Biased statement (+) 20 17 8 4 3 0
There are still more problems to be aware of. The supply side might not be
competitive. Let us consider for example a market with a single firm providing water to the
locality, and say the firm is public and interested in enlarging its budget. Assume that the
only restriction of the firm is to be profitable. In this framework, the provision will be the
largest possible, while the surplus is strictly positive. Taking the true demand revelation of
table 1as an example, the amount of water provided would be 14 units, and the surplus
would be lower than optimal: E* = (19 + 6 + 3) – (1 + 1 + (12 * 2)) = 2 monetary units.
In short, for the water projects to be efficient, the strategic behavior of both
consumers and providers (among other problems) has to be avoided. To ensure this, all
agents should have incentives to reveal their true preferences and behave efficiently. This is
the subject of the next section.
2.2.2. The proposed model
Let water be demanded for both production and final consumption purposes.
Suppose that the total amount of disposable water is usually sufficient. However, with a
given probability, there may not be enough water to always satisfy both types. In deficit
situations producers and consumers that demand water bear a cost associated with the
8shortage. In order to reduce the cost, an investment plan to increase water availability
through a desalination plan is proposed. The unitary investment costs are known, but in
order to determine the scale of the project, its (gross) benefits are to be estimated.
Consider that access to desalinated water has the characteristics of a collective good,
and therefore does not offer individual incentives to contribute to its financing. All the
demand agents are interested in the project being undertaken, but the free-rider problem
arises. If individual agents are asked for their willingness to pay for the project, they will
tend to understate (overstate) their value if they believe the answer would influence the
amount of taxes they will have to pay. But the estimated demand function is drawn from
the individual answers of the agents, and from it the (gross) social benefit is computed and
the optimal amount of water determined. A procedure that ensures that it is in the best
interest of each individual agent to honestly reveal his/her maximum willingness to pay
would overcome the problem. There are several such procedures. The one proposed here is
a variant of the Thompson (1966) mechanism.
The Demand Side
When the provision of one collective good has to be chosen from two or more
alternatives, each agent may prefer one over the others, and their choices do not necessarily
coincide. When the socially chosen alternative is not the one that a given agent prefers,
he/she therefore bears an opportunity cost. However, as shown below, an insurance
mechanism gives incentives to individuals to reveal their “true” opportunity cost. In this
way, the demand revelation problem can be overcome, because the good that provides the
largest social benefit is also the one that provides the minimum social opportunity cost.
To exemplify the problem, suppose one wants to find out the individual’s maximum
willingness to pay for a collective good, such as desalinated water in case of drought, for
each potential consumer (or a sample of them) - in other words, to find out the individual
and social losses of a drought season. Let us say that the government makes an
announcement saying that it is prepared to offer insurance against drought (or water
scarcity in general) to those who want to purchase it. The government informs that the
probability of not having scarcity (event P) is p, while the drought (event Q) has a
probability (1-p) of happening. For the mechanism to work properly, agents have to believe
that the announced probability is the actual one. The unitary price to be paid for contracting
insurance coincides with the drought probability (1-p), and at that price agents can insure
for the amount of money they want. As shown below, this mechanism gives agents
incentives to subscribe to the insurance for a quantity equal to the expected loss.
Assume the actual value (a, b, …) of each agent (A, B, …) is that expressed in table
5, where the aggregate willingness to pay is V'(·) = a + b + ... + n. If agent A does not
subscribe to the insurance (no S), his/her mathematical expected benefit (EA) is the
probability of having water (p) multiplied by his/her benefit (a) from using the water:
EA (no S) = pa (1)
9Table 5. Actual valuation of (desalinated) water during a drought
Agents Valuations
A a
B b
... ...
N N
If agent A contracts the insurance against drought, he/she has to decide the optimal amount
in monetary units to receive in compensation (a + a’), where a’ is the bias –or lie -
introduced by agent A when revealing his/her valuation. When a’ > 0, agent A overstates
his/her interest; when a’ < 0 he/she understates it; with a’ = -a, the amount of the insurance
is zero (no S); and finally, with a’ = 0 agent A reports his/her actual (unbiased) valuation.
The insurance premium will be
 HA = (1 - p) (a + a’) (2)
where (1-p)a’ is the overpayment (or underpayment) of premiums due to the lie a’ by agent
A concerning events P (no drought) and Q (drought). The compensation payment for loss if
Q occurs is the insured value (a + a’). The net benefit agent A obtains depends on whether
P or Q occurs, which happens at probability p and (1 – p) respectively. The mathematical
expected benefit for agent A, (EA(S)), if he/she takes out insurance is therefore
EA(S) = pa + (1 - p) (a + a’) – HA (3)
And substituting HA from (2),
EA(S) = pa (4)
An initial conclusion from (4) is that the expected net benefit to an individual agent
from the insurance is regardless of the lie a’. Furthermore, (4) coincides with the expected
benefit without insurance, (1). However, there is an important difference. The risk in
subscribing to the insurance at the honest valuation is different to subscribing to it at a
biased valuation, or in not subscribing to it at all.
Without insurance, the agents will obtain either the value a or zero, depending on
whether P or Q occurs, which depends on the risk of drought, which might not be
negligible. Furthermore, if agent A gets insured against Q, but lies (a’ ¹ 0), and only P
occurs, he/she obtains the actual benefit (a), and pays (1 - p) (a + a’), which reports a net
benefit of
pa – (1 – p)a’ if P occurs
It can be seen that the payoff decreases as a’ increases
On the other hand, if Q occurs, agent A will get back the amount (a + a’) and pay (1
– p) (a + a’), which implies a net benefit of
p(a + a’) if Q occurs
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This monetary amount increases with a’. Table 6 summarizes the benefits from the two
events.
Table 6. Payoffs from events P and Q
Event Value Gross benefit Premium cost Net benefit
P a a (1 - p)(a + a')  pa - (1 - p)a'
Q 0 (a + a') (1 - p)(a + a') pa + pa')
With “dishonest” insurance, agent A gets the same net mean expected return –as
derived from (4) - than with an honest insurance. However, the difference in the net benefit
between P and Q is precisely a’. Agent A fixes the variance he/she wants, since all the
benefits but a’ are regardless of the event that occurs. As a result, the larger the bias a’, the
larger the risk will be. And for an agent who does not subscribe to the insurance, the risk
gets larger with his/her actual value a, thus giving a greater incentive to participate in the
insurance market.
If an agent is risk averse, he/she will prefer the less risky option if both offer the
same expected return but different risk levels. In this case, the preferred option is a’ = 0. In
other words, he/she will prefer to reveal an unbiased valuation.
Obviously, the case of agent A can be extended to the other agents, B, C, etc.… No
agent will have an incentive to lie, if he/she is risk averse, which was the desired result for
the mechanism proposed. Table 7 sums up the different results.
Table 7. Different insurance combinations
Net benefit Net benefit with Insurance
Without insurance Dishonest  (a' ¹ 0) Honest (a' = 0)
Event P a pa - (1 - p)a' pa
Event Q 0 pa + pa' pa
Expected return pa Pa pa
Benefit range [a] - [0] = a [pa - (1 - p)a'] - [pa + pa'] = a' [pa] - [pa] = 0
Does risk exist? YES YES NO
Risk increases with value of a with value of a' NO
A remarkable characteristic of this mechanism is that the incentives to reveal true
values are regardless of the probability p. However, the net benefit for consumers increases
with p. On the other hand, the government (which issues the insurance) collects more
money as p decreases. This would usually pose a problem, since the government would
have incentives to collect more. In this case, though, the probability is observable (either
there is a drought or there is not), which makes the problem less likely to happen.
The Supply Side
Once the actual demand is known, the question is to determine the optimal
investment I* in desalination to increase the probability p of not having water shortages. In
other words, the value I* that maximizes the net social benefit has to be determined.
Let p(I) be the function that relates the non-drought probability with the investment
level, with p’I > 0, "I ³ 0. Suppose that an investment of value I is undertaken during the
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initial time period (0). As a consequence, a value V (associated to event P with probability
p) is obtained at each time period during T periods, as reflected in table 8.
Table 8. Investment and returns per each time period
0 1 ... T
- I pV ... pV
The Net Present Value (NPV) of the investment is
NPV(r) = -I + pV[1/(1+r) + 1/(1+r)2 + ... + 1/(1+r)T] =
= -I + pV[1/r - 1/r(1+r)T], (5)
which yields
NPV(r) = -I + pV/r (6)
when T is large, with r being the discount rate.
The optimization program is
Max NPV = -I + pV/r
I ³ 0
and the marginal optimality condition is
p'V = r (7)
The condition means that investment has to reach the level where its marginal return
(dp/dI)·V equals the marginal cost of capital, r. Since it is not certain that the investment
generates net benefits, the optimal level I* is desirable when NPV(I*) > 0, and there should
be no investment whenever NPV(I*) £ 0.
For instance, let V’ = 2000 be the marginal social value of securing a water supply,
and let the relationship between the investment level (I) and the non-drought probability (p)
be the one shown in table 9.
Table 9. Relationship between investment and probability of non-drought
I 0 500 600 800 1200 1800 2750 4000 7000 9000 15000
p 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
Applying the optimality rule – adapted to the example case, which is discrete - and
taking an opportunity cost of capital of r = 10%, the following expression can be found:
(Dp/DI)·V = r = 10 % (8)
Table 10 shows that the optimal level of investment in the example would be I*=2750
monetary units. This would ensure a water supply with a chance of 60%, with a NPV of
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9250. Note that this is larger than NPV(I = 0) = 6000. Therefore the DNPV = 3250 > DI =
2750.
Table 10. Optimal level of investment in relation to the other variables
I 0 500 600 800 1200 1800 2750 4000 7000 9000 15000
P 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
(Dp/DI)V - 20 100 50 25 16.67 10.52 8 3.33 5 1.67
NPV 6000 6500 7400 8200 8800 9200 9250 9000 7000 6000 1000
For this market to work correctly, the insurance agency needs to have incentives to
apply the optimality rule in (7). Suppose the insurance agency wants to maximize its
benefits. In order to obtain an efficient result it would be sufficient for the agency to pay the
quantity V in case of drought (event Q with probability 1-p), and receive an inflow of S (or
its equivalent s per period, where s/r = S) that ensures its financial balance. The insurance
agency program would then be
Max NPV = S - I - (1- p)V/r,
I ³ 0
that is,
Max NPV = S - I - V/r + pV/r (9)
 I ³ 0         
Since both S and V/r are constants, (9) yields the same marginal optimality conditions, p’V
= r, as the previous programs. It is therefore socially desirable to have the agency
maximizing its net benefits.
2.2.3. Some remarks on the provision of insurance of water availability
Before estimating the optimal amount of desalinated water to be provided, it is
advisable to characterize the good from an economic perspective. It is especially important
to ascertain whether – or to what degree - the good is consumptive. Depending on the
good’s characteristics, it is not reasonable to expect that the market will provide efficient
results by itself. Both consumers and producers may have incentives (additional personal
benefits) to behave strategically. As a consequence, it is advisable to design procedures that
are compatible with individual incentives, and therefore individual decisions will lead to
efficient results.
For this, a mechanism has been proposed for the demand side, based on an
insurance subscription. In its original version, the mechanism only operates on the demand
side, and it is aimed at choosing between two alternatives. The mechanism proposed here,
however, works for the selection of the optimal provision of collective goods.
Furthermore, in the original mechanism the probability of the event is exogenous,
unobservable, and plays no role in it. Furthermore, agents have to believe that the
exogenous probability given is the actual one. In the adaptation carried out here, the
probability is an endogenous variable, is observable, and is therefore less likely to be
manipulated.
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Since the supply side has also been modeled in a way that meets the incentive
compatibility criteria for producers, the model is complete, and the expected results ought
to be close to the optimum.
3. THE PROBLEM OF EXTERNALITIES
3.1. Characterizing the problem and refining the concept
An externality is any cost or benefit that is imposed involuntarily and without
compensation to any person. An externality arises when the range in which decisions are
taken is smaller than the range in which the costs and benefits of an economic activity take
place. In this way, not all the relevant costs and benefits are accounted for, but only those
that are inside the range of the decision – the privates - obviating the rest – the external. As
an example, if the range of the decision for a thermal power station project is the country,
the costs that acid rain causes in the forests of other countries will tend to be obviated,
because they are external costs.
When the activities of an economic agent, either producer or consumer, affect the
opportunities for activities by another economic agent, and the party causing this effect
does not pay for it, then this agent is causing an externality. The destructive use of air,
water or forests, as well as cultural production and technological innovation, thus affect
subsequent opportunities for using these resources, in both production and consumption. In
particular, the decisions taken by present generations positively and negatively affect the
opportunities for action of future generations.
When the externalities are shiftables –Bird (1987)- the first receptor of the
externality can stop receiving its effects by transferring it to others. Some typical examples
are the transport of residuals away from the area where they are generated and the change
in the route of heavy transport. The simplest and most direct way of transferring an
externality is transferring the activity that causes it: e.g. the location of highly pollutant
industries in developing regions constitutes a widespread application of the opportunities
for transferring an externality. The transfer of externalities is automatic in some special
cases, as happens with a great deal of the atmospheric pollution generated in a city. If one
tries to solve this kind of externalities, it is preferable, ceteris paribus, to act the closest
possible solution to the producer of the externality to avoid the extra social cost of the
successive transfers.
If the quantity of externality is the same for all the persons suffering from it and
coincides with the total quantity produced, the externality is said to be inexhaustible –
Bator (1958) - i.e., that it has the characteristics of a Samuelsonian collective good. The
reduction of the ozone layer as a consequence of consumption and production activities
causes an externality for each person that does not depend on the quantity of individuals,
although all of them suffer the same quantity of this impact. Signs and symbols have this
characteristic, and in general, so do all elements related with culture, from a principle of
physics to a literary work, and of course, the climate of the planet. The externality would be
locally inexhaustible if it fulfills the definition, but only within a locality, e.g. modification
of the microclimate in an area due to deforestation. An interesting case is the called network
externality – Katz and Shapiro (1985) - in which the impact of the externality not only falls
with the quantity of consumers but it increases, meaning it has hypercollective good
characteristics.
It is normal to consider the externality as a flow, i.e. the externality occurs during a
certain time period and when it stops the original situation returns. This is true of light
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pollution and air congestion. In this case there is a flow externality. However, in other cases
the effects of the externality do not disappear when the activity that has produced it ceases.
In this case there is a stock externality - Doeleman (1988) - because its effect is cumulative,
as is the case with DDT in the human organism, the disposal of mercury in the sea and the
production of radioactive waste. An activity that can cause a stock externality would not be
relevant if the system is capable of absorbing the externality without an appreciable change
in the basic characteristics of the affected resources. It would be then equivalent to a flow
externality. However, the same activity emits a relevant stock externality if the resource
crosses a certain threshold of relative scarcity that prevents assimilation without
environmental cost. Again, there is a conflict between present and future generations -
when a resource is extremely abundant for present generations it is logical that it is
exploited at a rate at which it ends up being scarce for future generations. In extreme cases,
a stock externality might cause irreversible situations such as the extinction of species
which limit the opportunities of future generations. The current level of knowledge about
natural processes does not always certain determination of whether an externality behaves
as a flow or as a stock.
As is the case with goods, some externalities are transformable, which increases the
possibilities of regulation and complicates the process for internalizing these costs. In some
cases, it is possible to reduce the cost of an externality by means of simple transformations,
such as the compacting of solid urban residuals. Furthermore, if a solid or liquid pollutant is
burnt, it becomes another pollutant, which is maybe even more harmful and is more
difficult to control as it is gaseous. This might benefit the producer, but it increases the
inefficiency of the system as a whole.
In any case where there are negative (positive) externalities as a consequence of the
production or consumption of a good, the market allocation of this good will be inefficient
due to excess (shortage) as a result of the market not considering all costs and benefits -
internal costs are computed while external costs are ignored. Solving a problem of
externalities does therefore not mean eliminating the externality but only taking into
account its entire value, that i.e. achieving the internalization of the external costs (benefits)
in such a way that the consideration of the costs and benefits is complete.
An externality is said to be relevant in allocative terms if the social marginal benefit
differs from the private marginal benefit, as the latter does not take into account the
corresponding external benefit and/or when the social marginal cost is different from the
private, as the latter does not incorporate the external cost. A typical example of an external
marginal benefit would be the benefit for the whole society from an increase in the
consumption of culture by an individual, and a typical case of external marginal cost is the
pollution produced by cars.
It might be the case there was an externality in absolute terms, but that the marginal
externality was zero in the optimum. In this case there is said to be an inframarginal
externality – Buchanan and Craig (1962) - which is not relevant in allocative terms
providing that the benefit provided by the externality exceeds the costs of avoiding it. Let
us assume that there are two technologies for producing output X, A and B. The net private
benefit of the activity produced with technology A is of $100, the total external cost due to
pollution is $25 and the external marginal cost is zero in the point of optimal production.
As the externality is inframarginal, the quantity decided by producers coincides with the
optimal quantity and there are no reasons of efficiency to justify public intervention.
However, with technology B, the private marginal cost would increase to $4 although the
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total external costs would be reduced to $1. The producer does not have incentives for
adopting the new technology because his/her profits would be reduced, and as technology
A does not generate marginal externalities there is no problem by hypothesis, which is
absurd. There is no doubt that it is necessary to take all the externalities into consideration,
and not only the marginal ones, in order to mitigate environmental problems.
3.2. The solutions of economic theory to the problem of externalities
All the imaginable theoretical solutions to the problem of externalities are variants
of a unique solution: reassigning the property rights. From an economic perspective, if
there is no regulation of any kind, it is as if all the property rights - including the right to
destruction -3 were assigned to polluters. In fact, in the absence of regulation, any potential
polluter can pollute by production or consumption activities with no need to pay for it in
any way, with no need to ask for permission or give explanations to anybody, as if he/she
possessed the entire property rights to the resource that is being polluted. If the cause of the
problem lies in the actual allocation of the property rights to the polluters, it is therefore
clear that any solution should take a reallocation of property rights into account. A
reduction in the quantity of the property rights controlled by the polluters is required.
The basic ways of redistribution or reallocation of property rights are: a-
Enlargement of the range considered. b.- Taxation a la Pigou, c- Administrative regulation,
d.- Market negotiation and e- Cultural regulation. As will be seen below, these solutions are
relatively effective for solving the problems of present generations but do not allow the
externalities affecting future generations to be solved.
a- Enlargement of the range considered. An externality is defined as all the impacts
outside the range in which all costs and benefits are considered. Enlarging the range is thus
enough to make the externality disappear. For example, a country that is part of the
European Union has to accept EU discipline which includes the internalization of some
externalities.
b- The taxation solution a la Pigou – the polluter pays principle - consists of a tax
per unit of production or of consumption equal to the value of the external marginal cost,
evaluated at the optimal quantity in the sense of Pareto. As it is a tax per unit, the marginal
private cost increases by the exact value of the tax, the value of the marginal external cost,
so the externality is internalized. Other taxes, such as the one on sales or value added tax,
distort the relative prices of goods and cause inefficiency (dead weight). However, the tax
that corrects externalities improves the efficiency of the system. For this reason, if the
collecting capacity of the Pigovioan tax is used for reducing or eliminating a classical tax,
then there is a double gain, known as a double dividend.
c- With the solution by means of an administrative regulation, the property rights
pass to the state, which concedes pollution permits to some agents, in set maximum
quantities and under certain conditions. Administrative regulation takes multiple forms and
is applied in a global way, either specifically or combined. For example, the transit of cars
in a city can be restricted when the total pollution overcomes a preset value 4. This is an
                                                
3 They also enjoy the right of negotiation of these property rights, although it would not be used. On the one
hand, as any potential polluter he/she has the same right, it would be nonsense that a potential polluter paid
for something that could be freely obtained. In addition, the purchase of property rights in order to reduce
pollution is problematic, because it would be necessary to buy the property rights of all possible polluters.
4 Paradoxically, the limit is not determined in relation to the total quantity of pollution produced but to the
pollution remaining after the winds have transferred a part to other areas.
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ideal solution if the prohibition of an activity (making fires in forests) or making it
compulsory (primary education) is a good approximation to the optimum, because the
administrative and compliance costs are minimal.
d- The market negotiation solution, the so-called Coasian solution, is based on free
negotiation between two types of agents, those incurring in an opportunity cost if they
cannot increase pollution and those that obtain greater utility as pollution falls.
The state possesses all the property rights, transfers a part to some agents according
to some prefixed criteria and organizes a market for those property rights. Negotiation takes
place between agents that, given the market price of the property rights, received property
rights in excess (supply) and those that wish to have a greater quantity of rights (demand),
for polluting more or for preventing others from polluting. The resultant prices and
quantities coincide with the Pigouvian solution under ideal conditions 5 and, they would be
the same if all the property rights were given to polluters and if they were given to the
victims. Under less ideal conditions, the result will not be efficient and the bias will depend
on the distribution of property rights. With the property rights in the hand of polluters
(victims), the inefficiency would always be an excess (shortage) of pollution.
Although in some cases it could be a useful solution for solving the externalities in a
certain (developed) country, the consequences of applying a similar process between two
countries – or two regions in the same country - can be regrettable if the difference in
wealth between suppliers and demanders is a large one. In fact, there are many examples of
exports of residuals from rich to poor countries at very low prices and with grave global
consequences.
e- Cultural regulation, unlike the other solutions, only allows some kind of
externalities to be solved - those that depend on individual agents, typically the consumers
in some way. The reallocation of property rights is done in favor of society as a whole and
there are social sanctions for those that do not follow the rules that are generally conveyed
orally. This solution is appropriate as an alternative to administrative regulation and also as
a complement to it. It is also useful for avoiding what Kant called the tyranny of small
decisions, which consists of a high social cost (benefit) caused by multiple individual
decisions, each implying a negligible cost (benefit). The main advantage of this kind of
solution is its relatively low cost and its stability over time.
3.3. Limitations of the solutions to externalities
In spite of the quantity and variety of good instruments for internalizing
externalities, the problem should not be expected to be easily or quickly solved. The
internalization of main externalities has a cost, which judging by the policies followed by
most countries – hesitant and slow - is too high to be assumed by the current economic
system. It seems that the participation of various generations will be necessary in order to
assume the economic costs of taking environmental externalities into account.
An important restriction is the one derived from the current administrative structure
available. With the exception of countries with a powerful and efficient administrative
organization, which is able to detect any negative deviation and solve it immediately, none
of the classical solutions could be applied in the form and intensity needed - even the
Coasian market solution.
                                                
5 That is to say, under conditions perfect competition, without marginal transaction costs and with a negligible
income effect.
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The limitations that are inherent in each kind of solution manifest themselves in real
applications. Any way of internalization - the Pigouvian way or any other - necessarily
affects costs and so affects market prices. This is at odds with the need to be competitive in
international markets, because countries that do not internalize externalities can offer the
same product at a lower price (green dumping). Any solution to the problem is therefore
more easily applicable in local than in international markets.
In the regulation of externalities, some of the agents causing them are usually
unaffected by the correcting tools. For example, if an urban toll is established to reduce city
congestion and pollution, it is highly probable that those using ambulances, police vehicles
and fire engines, among others, will not be not subject to this tax. Logically, the toll tries to
reduce journeys in private vehicles but, undoubtedly, it does not try to stop the activity of
the various public services. However, this fact complicates the computation, because now
the activity of the users that are exempt from the tax should be subtracted from the optimal
quantity in order to determine the remaining quantity for the non-exempt users. Under these
conditions, the first best solution would not be achieved, but instead the second best
solution in the best of cases.
In any case, the most serious limitations appear when trying to solve
intergenerational externalities. Intergenerational externalities exist because the actions of
present generations affect the possibilities of future generations. There is also a kind of
externality consisting of the fact that present generations have defined preferences
concerning the consumption or welfare of their descendants, future generations. There are
therefore externalities between present generations and future generations that should be
internalized, either if the objective is a redistributive improvement or if it is merely an
increase in economic efficiency.
It should be remembered that any imaginable solution to an externalities problem
requires an expropriation of propriety rights because in the absence of regulation, these
belong completely to the agents that cause them, i.e. the present generations in this case. In
the case of the externalities affecting future generations, if these external effects have to be
internalized, at least a part of the property rights should therefore be transferred from
present generations to future generations. For the moment, there is no practical way of
carrying out this transfer and all the property rights belong de facto to present generations.
The means of management of these natural and environmental resources is therefore free
access for the present generations, which is the most inefficient of the possibilities.
The limitations of classical solutions are very serious in the intergenerational
context. In the Pigouvian solution, for example, it is necessary to determine the value of the
external marginal cost. In the case of a non-durable externality, such as noise, it is
“enough” to find out the valuation of present generations. However, when the externality
has durable effects, as is the case when nuclear waste is generated, a language is lost, a
species disappears, or pollutants are continuously dumped in the sea, the computation of
this cost is different if one considers the perspective of future generations than if the
interests of future generations are also taken into account.
The application of a solution a la Coase has serious problems. As future generations
cannot act in any way in the property rights market, because they do not exist yet, and
because they do not have a representative that can negotiate in their name on equal terms
with other agents, this solution is not applicable.
It is unreasonable to expect an administrative regulation by means of norms for
internalizing externalities to appropriately take into account the interests of future
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generations, given that future generations do not have anyone representing them before
those design and apply the norms.
The same will occur with a Pigouvian solution with an externality only affecting
future generations. The government does not have incentives to burden its potential voters
with a tax benefiting of their descendants, because future generations do not have either a
voice or a role in the political arena.
Furthermore, if a member of present generations sees that his/her interests have
been harmed, he/she has recourse to the administrative and law system to defend his/her
interests. However, this is not possible for future generations, so the possible harm that they
suffer would go unpunished, in as far as that they do not have a legally recognized
representative that could claim damages in their name.
In conclusion, as any solution needs from the reallocation of property rights, and as
future generations do not have any system which allows them to defend their property
rights, it can be stated that, for the moment, economic theory does not provide any
mechanism for internalizing the externalities that would affect future generations.
3.4. An application of a case of externalities
3.4.1. The choice of the best use for a space
There is a limited space available that can be used in only way from use among
different incompatible alternatives. The gross social value of the space in its current state is
V0, and the value corresponding to the different alternatives is V1, ..., Vn, respectively.
Adapting the space to use j involves a transformation cost Cj ³ 0, j = 1, , ..., n. Initially, two
cases can happen:
Case 1.
V0 > Vj, "j. In this case, there is a sufficient condition for the transformation of the
use of the space, which we call project T, not to be interesting under any circumstances and
so the problem is already solved. The best option is the current one, the 0, and the value of
the space is V0.
Case 2.
$h such that V0 < Vh, h = 1, ..., H. If there is at least one use providing a greater
social value than the current use, then there is a necessary condition for project T to be
desirable, but this condition is not a sufficient condition. Two things might happen, either
V0 > Vh - Ch, " h or $k V0 < Vk - Ck, which is examined next.
a) V0 > Vh -  Ch, " h. Under these circumstances, the project T is not desirable
because the condition is necessary and sufficient for the non-desirability of modifying the
current use. In spite of the fact that the use 0 is not the best, because there are better
alternatives, the cost of transformation is high enough to prevent the transformation. The
value of the space is still V0, both ex ante and ex post. If, for any reason, the space was
transformed by giving it another use, e.g. use s, then the value of the space ex ante would
be equal to the maximum value among Vs and (V0 - Cs ) and the value ex post would be of
Vs.
b) $k V0 < Vk -  Ck, k = 1, ..., m, m+1, ..., K. The current use 0 is not optimal
because there are K better alternatives and, besides, the change of use implies an increase in
value which more than compensates for the cost of transformation Ck. Here there is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the desirability of the transformation of T.
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It could be the case that V0 was taken as the valuation ex ante of this space, but this,
as we will see, would not be correct at all. Before starting the valuation task, the soundness
of the K alternatives should be examined. The best alternative in relation to the status quo
is the use m that fulfills Vm - Cm ³ max{Vk - Ck}, and this is the best use of the space6. As a
hypothesis, we have V0 < Vm - Cm, the maximum that one would be willing to pay for the
space in the state 0 is Vm - Cm, and the value ex ante of the space is for this reason, (Vm -
Cm). Carrying out the project T, the ex post value changes to Vm, because the cost Cm is a
sunk cost as it cannot be modified in any way and thus, it should not be taken into account.
To summarize the above,
Best Space valueCases 0 is
optimal use
T,
desirable
Type of condition
ex ante ex post
V0 > Vj Yes 0 Þ No sufficient V0 V0
V0 < Vh no h Ü Yes necessary
V0 > Vh - Ch no 0 Û No necessary and
sufficient
V0 V0
V0 < Vm - Cm no m Û Yes necessary and
sufficient
Vm - Cm Vm
3.4.2. The distribution of a space among two incompatible uses
Let us assume that there is a total quantity of space e, which cannot be increased in
any way. There are two alternative uses of this space — a and b , which are incompatible.
The problem is that of separating those uses and distributing the total space between both
uses in an optimal way.
Let us assume there are a users of type a and b users of type b , and that all the users
of the same type are identical. The users j have defined preferences over the goods Xj, j = a,
b , and Y. Y is a pure private good that is available in a predetermined quantity w. The
goods Xj are local collective goods, which are produced7 using the private good as an input
(Zj) according to the functions
Xj - fj(Zj) = 0 fj (10)
being fj the multipliers associated to shadow prices constraints. As Xj are local collective
goods, all the users j will consume the total quantity produced Xj.
The total quantity of private good w is distributed between its use as an input and its
use as a consumption good,
w - Za - Zb - aYa - bYb ³ 0 l (11)
with l being the shadow price of the private good.
                                                
6 Under ideal conditions, as a perfect capital market. In other cases -for example, if there were financial
restrictions-, there is the possibility that another alternative would be preferable.
7 Instead of interpreting Xj = f(Zj) as the result of a production process it can be seen as the access cost to good
j that provides the space ej.
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Consumption of the good Xj requires the space ej. The total quantity of available
space is prefixed in e, so it is not possible to modify it
e - ea - eb ³ 0    s (12)
with s being the shadow price of the space as a resource.
The benefit obtained depends on the quantity of goods X and Y consumed, which
constitutes a gross social benefit (SB) of
SB = aÕa(Xa, Ya) + bÕb(Xb, Yb) (13)
The two uses of the space generate negative externalities that are locally
inexhaustible. The costs (SC) of Xj depend on the quantity Zj of the private good employed
in its production, on the number of users on the activity j, and on the quantity of available
space for each use j,
SC =  Ca(Xa, ea, a) + Cb(Xb, eb, b) (14)
The objective is to maximize the net social benefit, NSB = SB – SC, taking into
account the production function of Xj and the constraints on the quantity of space and
private good Y. The control variables of the maximization program are the quantity of
space allocated to each use (ea, eb,), the quantity of users (a, b) of each type (a, b), the
quantities of the collective goods and the distribution of the private good. Both the quantity
of total space e and the total income w, are problem data and cannot be modified.
The marginal conditions of optimality are quite simple:
¶Õa/¶Ya = ¶Õb/¶Yb (15)
¶Ca/¶ea = ¶Cb/¶eb (16)
¶fj/¶Zj + ¶Cj/¶Xj  = i¶Õj/¶Xj, j = a, b , i = a, b (17)
and the interpretation is quite direct:
a) To distribute the quantity of the private good in such a way that there is equality in the
marginal benefit for all users
b) To distribute the space between the uses j in such a way that the marginal benefit derived
from the space is the same for both spaces
c) To produce the collective goods j in such a way that the sum of the marginal benefits of
the users of each type is equal to the cost of production – the Samuelsionian condition for
local collective goods - plus the cost of the marginal externality – the Pigouvian condition
for internalizing externalities.
3.5. Some remarks on the problems of externalities
The set of economic instruments for internalizing externalities and providing
collective goods is more or less satisfactorily effective in solving the environmental
problems affecting present generations. However, these same instruments are inappropriate
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for considering the externalities that present generations inflict on future generations and
for preserving intergenerational goods.
If the world ended with present generations, problems such as climate change or the
loss of biodiversity would merit much less attention. The reason for this is simple - the
costs for present generations are relatively low, while they are expected to be very high for
future generations.
It should be remembered that a necessary condition for the internalization of
intergenerational externalities is the existence of a system which allows future generations
to have a part of the property rights and to manage and negotiate them with no limitations
other than those governing the behavior of present generations. At present, there is no
institution which allows property rights to be transferred to future generations. Efforts
towards environmental management following conventional economic theory therefore
only work in favor of the interests of present generations, in as far as they obviate the
interests of future generations.
We understand that the main problem we are faced with, is the conflict between the
interests of present generations and future generations. It is for this reason that we devote
the second part of this work to analyzing the consequences of this conflict, from both a
distributive and from an allocative perspective, focusing our analysis on the appraisal of
intergenerational policies and projects, which are usually used to help social decisions in
environmental problems.
4. FUTURE GENERATIONS IN PROJECT AND POLICY APPRAISAL
Conventional evaluation and management methods, such as the net present value,
have been widely criticized because of their discrimination against the interests of future
generations. These methods do not consider the existence of different generations and thus
ignore their interests. In short, their applicability to problems with strong long-term effects
has been questioned. This is the case of problems like climate change, the ozone layer hole,
deforestation and the loss of biodiversity. In this section, we analyze the limitations of
conventional economic evaluation of intergenerational problems and propose an alternative
for application to projects affecting future generations.8
4.1. The limitations of conventional evaluation of long term projects: discounting and
future generations
Conventional economic analysis gives less importance to flows that take place in the
future (a thorough review of the problems of conventional discounting can be found in
Broome (1992) and Price (1993, 1996)). The application of conventional time discounting
devalues and practically removes the impacts that occur in the distant future from the
analysis. A higher discount rate implies greater discrimination against future generations,
although any positive discount rate leads the analysis to strongly devalue and almost ignore
distant impacts.
The social discount rate (s) usually used to discount future impacts is expressed with
the Ramsey formula:
s = r + hg
                                                
8 See Padilla (2002) for a broader analysis of these limitations and a previous version of our proposal.
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where r is the pure time preference rate, h is the elasticity of marginal utility (absolute
value) of consumption and g is the growth rate of per capita consumption, i.e. discounting
is applied because of impatience and the belief that there will be more wealth per head in
the future.
Conventional cost-benefit analysis applies the time discount of the present society to
discounting all costs and benefits that will occur in the future, as if all future impacts
happened to present individuals. The consumption of future individuals is discounted using
a rate that shows the impatience of present society, while the logical procedure would be to
consider the preferences of present society for the well-being of future generations. An
intergenerational weighting appropriately showing these preferences should be applied.
The practical application of the argument of decreasing marginal utility of
consumption is also controversial. Applying a high discount rate because of assumed future
prosperity could lead to compromising this very prosperity by giving low weight to future
impacts (the ‘optimist paradox’).
The individuals originating long-term problems and the ones suffering their
consequences are certainly not the same individuals, and we are not certain that these future
individuals will enjoy greater well-being. Neither the argument of decreasing marginal
utility nor the pure time preference therefore justifies the application of a constant time
discounting to long-term impacts.
Many economists still use a much cruder basis for discounting, i.e. the opportunity
cost of investment funds. In this way, the resources would be placed in the highest yielding
projects, thereby obtaining greater future well-being. This argument is hardly justifiable in
the intergenerational context, as it is based on the full reinvestment of the revenues
obtained from the exploitation of the resources, which has not occurred in the past and is
unlikely to occur in the future (Price, 1996).
The weights to apply to future generations should reflect the altruistic preferences of
society and not just be an arbitrary extension of the time preferences of the present (this is
analyzed in Section 5). However, considering these altruistic preferences does not
guarantee that the interests of future generations are appropriately taken into account. If
future generations have certain rights that should be respected, these rights should be
included in the analysis.
4.2. Intergenerational equity and the sustainability requirement
Conventional economic analysis implicitly assumes that the Earth and all its
resources belong exclusively to present individuals. What is more, the present has the
power to decide how to use these resources. As a consequence, the endowment that will
reach the hands of future generations is just a residue of the decisions of present individuals
and not the result of a negotiation or market including the interested parties. Although there
are altruistic preferences that should be considered, these do not solve the entire problem.
For a satisfactory solution, both parties (present and future) should arrive at an agreement
(which is certainly not possible) or make the recognition of certain rights to future
generations based on moral grounds explicit, and act accordingly.
Strong moral, contractual, or deontological justifications lead to rejection of the
premise ‘everything belongs to the present’ as a legitimate starting point. Conventional
analysis takes the market as the only relevant condition, arguing that this procedure is not
value laden. However, this option implies both denying any right to the unborn since they
cannot participate in present markets, and accepting that the present can do whatever it
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pleases without any limit, which certainly is strongly value laden. In order to respect the
interests of future generations, present actions should be kept within some limits. It would
be more appropriate if these were subject to moral restrictions or, if as a result of a
contractual vision, assumed sustainable development as an implicit moral agreement
between generations (Barret, 1996; Howarth, 1997).
Much of the literature on sustainability tries to establish different criteria compatible
with a development that can be sustained over a long course of time, i.e. compatible with a
minimum of intergenerational equity. The most popular definition states that sustainable
development is the “…development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (WCED, 1987, p.
8). This definition implies limiting the present use of resources.
From an optimistic point of view, if every time that natural capital diminishes, an
increase in the equivalent manmade capital takes place, then the capacity to maintain the
quality of life would not be affected. This is known as the ‘weak sustainability’ criterion. It
somewhat further than conventional economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis because it
denies the validity of the Hicks-Kaldor test in the intergenerational context and demands
actual compensation if future generations suffer from present actions (Neumayer, 1999).
However, it is based on the unreal assumption of perfect substitution between different
types of capital. Sustainable development requires making the limits to substitution part of
the analysis, and not making very uncertain assumptions that might jeopardize future
generations. The respect for future generations’ interests needs the implementation of the
‘strong sustainability’ requirement, a criterion that requires the maintenance of the quantity
and quality of natural capital over time, and of some critical levels of certain types of
natural capital. 9 Costanza (1994, p. 394) justifies it as a “…prudent minimum condition for
assuring sustainability”. Ignorance and uncertainties about substitution possibilities imply
that there is no feasible way of putting the weak sustainability criterion into practice on a
global scale in order to assure sustainability. Present generations will ensure fair treatment
for future generations if the levels of the different types of capital do not diminish.
The sustainable development requirement implies assuming a much more favorable
distribution of rights for future generations than that contained in conventional economic
analysis. Page (1983) states that the life opportunities of future generations will be
undiminished if they inherit the same resource base as that inherited by present generations.
Bromley (1989) analyzes the possibility of undiminished stocks of natural resources and
environmental quality for ensuring intergenerational justice. Finally, Howarth (1997)
asserts that the provision of specific endowments of reproduced capital, technological
capacity, natural resources and environmental quality may sustain life opportunities for
future generations. In conclusion, in order to guarantee fair treatment for future generations,
the analysis should consider their right to an undiminished socioeconomic and ecological
capacity. The capacity of the present to alter the conditions of life of the future imposes this
responsibility.
The recognition of rights to the future, with the application in each case of the
necessary proceedings, requires new evaluation and management methods integrating the
concerns expressed throughout this work as well as strong institutional support reinforcing
it.
                                                
9 Its quantification might be quite problematic; but it is in any case possible to have some indicators of its
evolution.
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4.3. Evaluation incorporating the sustainability requirement and intergenerational
weighting
This section proposes the application of a new evaluation process incorporating the
sustainability requirement and intergenerational weighting. The recognition of rights
implied by the sustainability requirement leads to the analysis of intergenerational problems
incorporating the obligation of maintaining the economic and ecological capacity that is
currently enjoyed. This requires a different evaluation of policies and projects, depending
on whether the structure of rights between generations is affected (intergenerational
evaluation) or not (ordinary evaluation).10
Ordinary evaluation. In the actions that only affect the generations taking the
decision, conventional evaluation and management methods are essential for determining
the most efficient allocation of resources. Nevertheless, there can be important distributive,
ecological, moral, affective, contractual, deontological, cultural, or political reasons for
society. These should also be considered in decision-making. As standard cost-benefit
analysis follows only the allocative efficiency criterion, in some cases it could be
appropriate to include it as merely an element of a more complete decision-making process.
Intergenerational evaluation. When a project has effects on generations not
participating in the decision process, various cases should be differentiated. There are
projects that will not negatively affect future generations, but there are also some that might
harm them. This separation cannot be made with economic information alone - the need to
consider geophysical and ecological conditions makes the evaluation and management of
sustainability into an interdisciplinary task.
Intergenerational projects not jeopardizing the capacity of the future, in principle, do
not give rise to a transaction of rights between generations and therefore do not imply
obligations for the present. However, the fact that present generations are (implicitly)
assumed to enjoy any future consumption shows that conventional valuation is quite
arbitrary. Following the reasoning of subsection 4.1, an intergenerational weighting should
be applied that properly shows the preferences of current society regarding the consumption
of future generations.
Any action jeopardizing the opportunities to be enjoyed by future generations
implies a transaction of rights between generations. In each case, it will be necessary to
consider which way of fulfilling the obligations to the future is least costly to the present.
The following relevant options could be considered:
a. Not to carry out the project: If a project causes irreversible harmful effects to future
generations and these cannot be avoided or compensated for, it should be considered as
being outside the choice of possibilities. This is the case with exploiting renewable
resources indefinitely beyond their regeneration rate, or overexploiting the assimilative
capacity of the environment. In addition, when there are serious risks or uncertainties,
obligations to the future imply a bigger risk aversion in decision-making. Basic processes
and some critical levels necessary for the sustenance of the ecological system should be
protected. The information of different scientific disciplines should help to determine which
goods require this protection.
                                                
10 Page (1997) arrives at similar conclusions and differentiates between ordinary and constitutional decisions
while Norton (1995) proposes a two-tier interdisciplinary approach.
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b. To undertake precautionary and control measures: If the modification of the structure of
rights that the original project implies is avoidable (e.g. enhancing security systems) and it
is still profitable, this option is more appropriate than the first. Conventional computation
of costs and benefits (ignoring the future) often leads to ignoring the adoption of security
measures or clean technologies, even if they could prevent severe harm to future
generations. The obligations of present generations imply that these measures should be
included within the unavoidable costs of the project.
c. Compensation through an associated project: In some projects it is possible to
compensate for the harmful effects on future generations through an associated project (e.g.
reforestation).11 The cost of the compensation should be included in the calculation of
profitability, and the way in which this became effective should be articulated. The rights of
future generations would thus be protected, with an exchange taking place between
generations. In order to permit this transaction of rights a sine qua non requirement should
be that decision-makers demonstrate that this compensation will be sufficient and will
become effective.
d. Financial compensation: This option would clearly modify the composition of the
capacity bequeathed to future generations. There should not be any doubts about the
possibility of substituting the diminished resources and of establishing an investment fund
enabling this future compensation. 12 The damage caused to future generations must
therefore be quantifiable in monetary units or, at least, it must be possible to demonstrate
that the compensation will, in all likelihood, be satisfactory. Once again, and unlike
conventional methods, it should become effective.
The evaluation process, should determine in each case which option is more
appropriate and, as argued above, economic information is not enough to decide this.
Figure 1, taken from Padilla (2002), outlines the evaluation process proposal.
                                                
11 This option coincides with the proposal of Markandya and Pearce (1988) on shadow projects.
12 Costanza and Perrings (1990) idea of environmental bonds could be seen as a way of coming into operation
this compensation.
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Figure 1. The evaluation process
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5. INTERGENERATIONAL WEIGHTING IN LONG-TERM PROJECT AND
POLICY APPRAISALS: THE MULTIGENERATIONAL NET PRESENT VALUE
In the previous section we have highlighted that conventional evaluation methods
have been broadly criticized because they disregard the impacts occurring to future
generations. Their application of time discounting gives a negligible weight to future
generations, besides not being very fair, it does not accord with the preferences of society.
Applying the time preference of present generations beyond their life-span, as if they were
immortal, ignores the fact that these impacts will occur to other individuals. This section
tries to overcome this arbitrary premise of conventional economic analysis and studies the
consideration of the impacts happening to future generations through an intergenerational
weighting which appropriately reflects the preferences of society.
5.1. Intergenerational weighting in a successive generations model with
intergenerational altruism
First, the paper considers an economy with successive (non-overlapping)
generations. In this model, society is composed of one generation of N individuals, which
at the end of each period is substituted by another generation of N individuals (their
descendants). The utility of present generation individuals is influenced by the utility level
of their descendants (non-paternalistic altruism), so the life utility of an individual is:
Unt = Vnt + bUnt+1 (18)
Where Vnt is the life utility function derived from own consumption of individual n of
generation t; b=(1+R)-1Î(0,1) is the altruistic parameter; Unt+1 is the life utility function of
the descendant, individual n of the next generation.
The utility function can be expressed as the next weighted sum of the satisfaction
that the future descendants derive from consumption (Vng):
Unt = å
¥
= t g
bg-tVng (19)
So, the intergenerational weighting that an individual of generation t applies to his/her
descendant of generation g is bg-t .
One of the principal premises of cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics is that
the preferences of the individuals that constitute a society should be taken into account.
Following the utilitarian criterion, the social welfare function is expressed here as the sum
of the utilities of the individuals that comprise society:
W =å
=
N
1 n
Unt = å
=
N
1n 
å
¥
= t g
bg-tVng (20)
Hence, the social intergenerational weight applied in moment t to individuals of
generation g is bg-t=(1+R)t-g, which is equal to the individual weight shown in (19).
However, this direct result does not hold if the coexistence in society of more than one
generation is considered, as shown in the next subsection.
5.2. Intergenerational weighting in an overlapping generations model with
intergenerational altruism
Overlapping generations models, introduced in economic analysis by Samuelson
(1958), provide the necessary tools for dealing with the coexistence of different generations
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in society. In the model considered in this section, society is composed of two generations
of N individuals each. Thus, in moment t there are N old individuals of generation t-1, with
the next utility function:
Unt-1 = å
¥
= 1- t g
bg-(t-1)Vng (21)
And there are N young individuals, of generation t, with the next utility function:
Unt = å
¥
= t g
bg-t  Vng (22)
Therefore, the intergenerational weighting that any individual of future generation t
applies to his/her descendant of generation g is bg-t, which is higher than bg-(t-1) the one
applied by the ascendant of generation t-1.
Society is composed of two generations that weight the consumption of future
generations differently. The valuation of own consumption of an individual of generation
t+1 influences the utility of his/her parent (present generation t) through weight b , and in
the utility of his/her grandparent (present generation t-1) through a smaller weight, b2. In
the same way, the remaining future generations influence to a different degree the utility of
different present individuals according to their propinquity. The social welfare function in
moment t is:
W =å
=
N
1n 
Unt-1+ å
=
N
1n 
Unt                       (23)
Which can be expressed as follows:
W = å
=
N
1n 
Vnt-1 + å
=
N
1n 
å
¥
= t g
(bg-(t-1) + bg-t)Vng (24)
Thus, the social intergenerational weight (mg) to apply in moment t to any individual
of generation g > t is:
mg = bg-(t-1) + bg-t = (1+R)-(g-(t-1)) + (1+R)-(g-t) (25)
Clearly, the social weighting to the consumption of future generations derived from
social preferences is not equal to any individual weighting. In addition, it clearly differs
from the arbitrary weighting that conventional discounting involves:
(1+r)-(g-t) ¹ (1+R)-(g-(t-1)) + (1+R)-(g-t) (26)
Inequality (26) shows that in moment t the weight discounting applies to generation
g (left hand side) notably diverges from the weighting derived from social preferences
(right-hand side). Moreover, it is not possible to express the social weighting as a simple
discount factor.
5.3. The Multigenerational Net Present Value
As shown previously, conventional discounting applies an arbitrary weight to future
generations. Some authors (Collard, 1981; Nijkamp and Rouwendal, 1988; Bellinger, 1991;
Padilla, 2002; Pasqual and Souto, 2003) have advocated in favor of substituting the weights
of the time discount factor for an intergenerational weighting applying an explicit weight to
each generation. However, they do not specify much about how these weights should be
determined. This paper’s view is that intergenerational weighting should show the
preferences of society regarding the consumption of future individuals.
There is a broad acceptance that the net present value (NPV) is an appropriate
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method for calculating the profitability in projects affecting only one generation or one
individual. Considering that each generation discounts its consumption flows through its
own time discount, NPVt might be defined as the value that individuals of generation t
assign to the increase in own consumption generated by the project. We propose the use of
the next weighted sum, the multigenerational net present value (MGNPV), for obtaining the
social valuation of the project:
MGNPV= NPV-1 + m0NPV0 + m1NPV1 + ... + mTNPVT (27)
Where T is the last generation affected by the project.
The weight to apply to each generation (mg) should correspond to the altruistic
preferences of individuals that compose society. In the model of two overlapping
generations, mg = (1+b)bg, (except for m-1, which is 1), and the derived social valuation is:
MGNPV = NPV-1+
t
T
=
å
0
(1+b)btNPVt (28)
This method might avoid the negligible weight conventional NPV applies to future
generations in long-term projects. Moreover, it takes into account the existence of different
generations and the interrelation between their welfare.
A more general expression for the MGNPV, for a society where people life-span is
H periods (so there are H generations) and have a child when they are p years old, can be
written as follows:
MGNPV = å
-=
0
Hg
(å
=
D
d 0
bdNPVg+pd)  (29)
Where d shows the propinquity of the descendant: for d = 0 it refers to individuals of
generation g, for d = 1 to children, for d = 2 to grandchildren, and so on. D is the number of
generations that are descendants of generation g and are affected by the project.
It should be noticed that the MGNPV does not apply a unique weight to any
consumption in a certain moment of time as does the conventional discount factor, but it
takes into account both the time preferences of the different generations and
intergenerational altruism preferences to show appropriately the preferences of society
about the different consumption flows.
5.4. Some comments on intergenerational weighting and MGNPV
An appropriate consideration of the impacts occurring to future generations requires
the application of an intergenerational weighting showing the preferences of society. This
weighting depends both on the generational structure and the degree of altruism of the
individuals, and clearly differs from the weight that involves the application of
conventional discounting. Moreover, individual and social intergenerational weighting
differ when the coexistence of more than one generation is taken into account.
A correct consideration of individual preferences about future consumption requires
that instead of conventional NPV, the MGNPV should be maximized in project appraisal.
This new evaluation method overcomes the arbitrariness of other methods, as it considers
both the time allocation of own consumption, and the intergenerational allocation.
6. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL OPTIMALITY OF INTERGENERATIONAL
INVESTMENTS
In projects appraisal theory, it is usual to recommend the net present value (NPV) or
the internal rate of return for determining the optimal level of investment, choosing
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between alternative projects, or simply, to indicate whether undertaking a specific project is
profitable or not. These methods are based on the application of a constant time discounting
to the impacts occurring in the future. Any impact that takes place in the very long run ¾
like many environmental impacts ¾ is given a negligible weight. The use of these methods
therefore implies taking investment decisions, obviating what will happen to future
generations, which usually leads to their interests being harmed. Furthermore, the
application of a constant discounting does not follow any justifiable equity criterion and nor
does it correspond to the true preferences of society. Future consumption is weighted
according to the time preference of present generations. Conventional analysis thus
implicitly assumes that present individuals have an infinite lifespan. However, it is obvious
that part of the future flows of consumption will be enjoyed by other generations. As a
consequence, it would be more appropriate to introduce the existence of different
generations into the analysis and to consider the interrelations between them, thereby taking
into account altruistic preferences, as we proposed in the previous section with the
application of the MGNPV. The intertemporal allocation of individuals’ consumption
throughout their life-span should not be confused with the intergenerational allocation,
which involves different generations. Both are part of the intertemporal allocation of
resources and it would be inappropriate to study just one of its components, obviating the
other.
The use of an overlapping generations model helps us to consider the efficiency of
the prescriptions of conventional methods used for the evaluation of intergenerational
investments, and to search which criterion should follow the public evaluation and
management of these investments in order to achieve an adequate consideration of
preferences. Nevertheless, as we have seen in section 4, the consideration of the interests of
future generations might also require the application of certain equity criteria, such as the
sustainability requirement.
6.1. An overlapping generations model with intergenerational altruism
We use an overlapping generations model with intergenerational altruism with the
following assumptions: the life-span of individuals is two periods, society is composed of
two generations (old and young) of N individuals each; at the end of each period the old
generation disappears and a new one appears, making the population consist of 2N
individuals.
Following a non-paternalistic altruistic model, similar to the one in Barro (1974), we
consider that individuals have the following utility function:
Ut = Vt + dUt+1 (30)
where Vt is the life utility derived from the own consumption of an individual of generation
t; d = (1+R)-1 is the intergenerational discount factor, which we assume is between zero and
one; Ut+1 is the life utility function of his/her descendant.
The egoist component of the utility function is:
Vt = V(C1t,C2t+1) = u(C1t) + (1+s)-1u(C2t+1) (31)
where (1+s)-1 is the discount factor that the individual applies to his/her second period
consumption due to his/her time preference; C1t is the consumption of the individual in
year t, when he/she is young; C2t+1 is the consumption of the individual when he/she is old;
u(·) is the function of satisfaction derived from consumption, which has the usual attributes
of increasing utility of consumption u'(·) > 0 and decreasing marginal utility of
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consumption u''(·) < 0.
We can rewrite the utility function of an individual of generation t:
Ut = u(C1t) + (1+s)-1u(C2t+1) + dUt+1 (32)
In this type of model, there is a chain interrelating the utility functions of present
generations with successive future generations. The welfare of any future descendant enters
into the utility function of the individual who, in order to maximize his/her utility, has to
maximize the next weighted sum of the satisfaction that his/her future descendants derive
from consumption:
Ut = Vt + dUt+1  = Vt + d(Vt+1  + dUt+2) = Vt + dVt+1  + d2 (Vt+2+ dUt+3) (33)
So, we can express the utility function as:
Ut = å
¥
= t g
dg-tVg (34)
In our analysis, we define social welfare as the sum of individual utilities.13 As a
consequence, the altruistic preferences of all the individuals of present society are taken
into account in the social welfare function, because their utility functions include these
preferences. If we assume that society at moment t is composed of two generations of N
individuals, t-1 (old) and t (young), we have the following expression for the social welfare
function:
W =å
=
N
1 n
Unt-1 + å
=
N
1 n
Unt (35)
Using (34) we obtain:
W = å
=
N
1n 
å
¥
= 1 - tg
dg-(t-1)Vng + å
=
N
1n 
 å
¥
= t g
dg-tVng (36)
Where n is a dynastic label, so the n individual of generation t+1 is the heir to the n
individual of generation t. In order to present a simpler notation, we omit this label in our
following analysis.
6.2. The optimality of intergenerational investments
We study various cases of investments affecting more than one generation. We will
compare the optimal decisions from individual and social perspectives, and analyze the
differences between them and the prescriptions of conventional methods.
6.2.1. Factors influencing on the choice between own consumption and an investment
that yields benefits to a descendant
Starting with the altruistic utility function and the social welfare function considered
above, we can make an initial approach to the factors influencing the determination of
social and individual optimal decisions in intergenerational investments. We start by
studying the case of the investment that an old individual gives to his/her descendant.
Firstly, we analyze the individual optimization problem. Looking at the total
derivative of the utility function (32), we can deduce that an old individual in society at
moment t will sacrifice his/her own consumption, in order to increase the consumption of
his/her descendant, up to the following point:
                                                
13 We adopt an extended version of utilitarianism where we include altruism in the utility function of
individuals and not only egoist preferences as the pure utilitarian version does.
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(1+s)-1u'(C2t)DC2t = d[u'(C1t)DC1t + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+1)DC2t+1] (37)
The left-hand side represents the cost in terms of utility involved in sacrificing consumption
(DC2t) for investment. The right-hand side shows the increase in utility given by the
increase in consumption of the descendant (flows DC1t and DC2t+1) caused by the
investment. We can see that in the investment decision, besides the magnitude of
consumption flows, there are also other influential factors. These are the altruistic
parameter d, the marginal utilities of consumption, and the time discount. However, in the
individual’s optimal decision, the time preference applied to the flows enjoyed by the
descendant is the time preference of the descendant and not the time preference of the
investor, unlike usual decision rules such as the NPV, where the time discounting of present
generations is used to discount all the flows of consumption generated by the investment.
We next analyze social optimization. Note that our social welfare function (36)
consists of the sum of the utilities of all the individuals present at moment t in society -
generations t-1 and t. In the investment of an individual of generation t-1 for his/her heir, all
the effects modifying these utilities should be considered. The utility of the investor is
affected by the utility of his/her descendant through the parameter d, and the heir values
his/her own consumption applying his/her own time preference.
The level of investment will be optimal when:
(1+s)-1u'(C2t)DC2t = (1+d)[u'(C1t)DC1t + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+1)DC2t+1] (38)
As in condition (37), the marginal utilities of consumption and the altruistic
parameter d are quite relevant. However, the relative weights of the different consumption
flows are clearly different from those of the individual condition because the consumption
of the young individual has more weight in the social consideration. This consumption
enters the social consideration not only due to the positive effect on his/her ascendant,
through the altruistic parameter d, but also due to its own valuation because his/her utility is
part of the social welfare function. Furthermore, in both cases, the time preference is
applied taking who enjoys the consumption into account.
In this analysis, we have seen some factors influencing social and individual optimal
decisions in intergenerational investments that are not taken into account in conventional
methods. These are the altruistic parameter d, and distinguishing the beneficiary of the
various flows of consumption when applying the time discount.
We next incorporate the individuals’ budget constraints. We assume that the
individuals have an inelastic labor supply in their first period of life, obtaining wt in
exchange, and transfer savings (st) to their second period of life at an interest rate r. We
should stress that for the case of intangibles and non-market goods, it might not be possible
to transfer consumption between periods at the market rate of interest. Moreover, even in
the case of private goods, the imperfections of capital markets might prevent this from
taking place in an efficient way. These problems suggest that in some cases we possibly
cannot go farther than conditions (37) and (38). However, we will obviate these problems
in this section, following the same steps as the usual theoretical analysis.
6.2.2. Investment of an old individual that yields benefits to his/her heir, both present in
current society
We first analyze an investment by which an individual of generation t-1 can transfer
consumption flows to his/her descendant in the period of investment and in the one after it.
The budget constraints of the investor of generation t-1 are:
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C1t-1 = wt-1 - st-1 + Y1t-1(bt-1) (first period constraint) (39)
C2t = (1+r)st-1 - bt + Y2t(bt-1) (second period constraint) (40)
where bt are the resources that the investor of generation t-1 invests in the project benefiting
his/her descendant; Y1t-1(bt-1) and Y2t(bt-1) are the consumption flows that receives from
the investment bt-1 transferred by his/her parent. The investment bt will yield the flows
Y1t(bt) and Y2t+1(bt) to be enjoyed by his/her descendant.
The maximization program of the individual of generation t-1 is:
Max Vt-1 + dVt s.t. (39) and (40)
st-1, bt
In the maximization program, we only need to consider the periods in which the decision
has a direct impact ¾ the investor’s valuation of his/her own consumption (Vt-1) and of the
consumption of his/her descendant (dVt), as we assume that the descendant allocates his/her
resources optimally.
 The first order conditions are:
First order condition with respect to st-1:
u'(C1t-1) = (1+s)-1(1+r)u'(C2t) (41)
First order condition with respect to bt:
(1+s)-1u'(C2t) = d[u'(C1t) Y1t + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+1)Y2t+1] (42)
where Y1t = Y1t  '(bt-1) and Y2t = Y2t  '(bt-1) (we will henceforth use this notation)
Condition (41) shows the optimal level of saving. This is achieved when the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption in period t-1 and consumption in period
t is equal to the marginal rate of transformation.
Condition (42) tells us the optimal level of investment in the project that the
descendant will enjoy. The left-hand side shows the cost in terms of utility of an additional
sacrifice of consumption in the second period of the investor’s life. The right hand side
shows the increase in utility which yielded by the increase in consumption of his/her
descendant (flows Y1t and Y2t) caused by the marginal increase of the investment. The
optimal level of investment depends not only on the consumption flows but also on the time
preference, the parameter d showing altruistic preferences, and the marginal utilities of
consumption.
Given the assumptions about altruism (d > 0) and decreasing marginal utility of
consumption (u''(·) < 0), the investment in a descendant depends on his/her consumption
level. This means that if there were the belief that the level of consumption increases with
each successive generation, the individual would give a lower weight to the consumption of
his/her descendants.
By combining (41) and (42) we obtain:
(1+r)-1u'(C1t-1) = d[u'(C1t)Y1t + (1+r)-1u'(C1t)Y2t+1] (43)
      (1+r)-1u'(C1t-1) = du'(C1t) [Y1t + (1+r)-1Y2t+1] (44)
which tells us that it is efficient to invest while the cost (left hand side) to the
investor of a marginal increase in the investment is lower than the benefits (right hand side)
that it yields. The consumption flows that the descendant receives are considered, and
discounted them using the interest rate, but with the reference point of the beneficiary. They
are then weighted using the altruistic parameter d, which discounts the fact that
consumption is enjoyed by the descendant and not the investor.
In order to facilitate comparison with the usual methods, and in the absence of better
information, if we assume that u'(C2t+1) = u'(C2t), which is equivalent to assuming that the
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different generations have a similar consumption level, the condition remains as follows:
(1+r)-1 =  d[Y1t + (1+r)-1Y2t+1] (45)
This condition implies a weighting that notably differs from the one applied in usual
evaluation methods, such as the NPV, in which the flows of consumption are weighted
taking only the time from the moment of evaluation into account, without considering who
enjoys the consumption. However, in expression (45), the consumption of the descendant is
considered by applying the time discount from his/her point of view and weighting it by
parameter d, which shows how the investor values the increase in the utility of his/her heir.
In the case analyzed, taking t as the reference point for discounting, the NPV shows
us that it is profitable to invest up to the next point14:
1 = Y1t + (1+r)-1Y2t+1 (46)
As we can see, the NPV does not consider who enjoys the consumption at all. It
simply applies the time discounting from the point of view of present generations, as if
these consumption flows were enjoyed by them.
Considering that our welfare function (37) is the sum of the utility functions of the
individuals of society, the social maximization program for the considered investment is:
Max Vt-1 + (1+d)Vt s.t. (39) and (40)
bt
The consumption of the descendant of generation t appears both for the consideration of
his/her ascendant dVt, and for his/her own consideration, because his/her utility is also part
of the social welfare function.
First order condition with respect to bt:
(1+s)-1u'(C2t) = (1+d)[u'(C1t) Y1t + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+1)Y2t+1] (47)
The condition regarding the optimal level of saving (41) remains unchanged. The
social condition of the optimal level of investment (47) differs notably from the individual
one (42). While in the individual case the weight given to the valuation of the consumption
of the heir is d, in the social case this weight is 1+d. This occurs because both the positive
effect that it causes on the investor (d) and the consideration of the young individual as part
of the social welfare function are taken into account.
By combining (41) and (47) we obtain:
(1+r)-1u'(C1t-1) = (1+d)[u'(C1t)Y1t + (1+r)-1u'(C1t)Y2t+1] (48)
      (1+r)-1u'(C1t-1) = (1+d)u'(C1t) [Y1t + (1+r)-1Y2t+1] (49)
which is different from (44). In this first case, we have observed that the inclusion
of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational altruism can lead to divergence
between individual and social optimal decisions. We have also observed that both decisions
can differ from the decision indicated by the conventional application of discounting
(condition (46)), which does not take into account who enjoys consumption but only
considers the time distance from the moment of evaluation.
6.2.3. Investment by a young individual that yields benefits to his/her descendant of the
first future generation
In this case, we assume that the investor, belonging to generation t, can transfer
consumption to his/her descendant through an investment project that yields benefits in the
                                                
14 For the sake of simplicity, in this analysis we assume that the discount rate used in the NPV is the interest
rate r. The qualitative conclusions would not change with respect to the case that we used the time
preferences.
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two following periods.
The budget constraints on the individual in generation t are:
C1t = wt  - bt - st + Y1t(bt-1) (first period constraint) (50)
C2t+1  = (1+r)st + Y2t+1(bt-1) (second period constraint) (51)
where bt are the resources that the individual of generation t devotes to the project whose
benefits are enjoyed by his/her heir; Y1t(bt-1) and Y2t+1(bt-1) are the consumption flows that
he/she receives from the investment bt-1 transferred by his/her parent. The investment bt
yields the consumption flows Y1t+1(bt) and Y2t+2(bt) that his/her descendant receives.
The individual maximization program is:
Max Vt + dVt+1 s.t. (50) and (51)
st, bt
This includes the valuation that the individual of generation t has of the different flows of
consumption that are directly modified by the investment and which affect his/her utility.
These are the valuations of his/her own (Vt) and his/her descendant's (dVt+1) consumption.
First order condition with respect to st:
u'(C1t) = (1+s)-1(1+r)u'(C2t+1) (41)
First order condition with respect to bt:
u'(C1t) = d[u'(C1t+1)Y1t+1  + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+2)Y2t+2] (52)
The savings condition (41) remains unchanged. The left-hand side of the investment
condition (52) shows the cost in terms of utility involved in an additional sacrifice of
consumption during the first period of life. The right-hand side shows the increase in utility
yielded by the increase in consumption of the heir caused by the increased investment in an
additional unit.
Taking condition (41) one period forward, and substituting in (52) we obtain:
u'(C1t) = u'(C1t+1)d[Y1t+1  + (1+r)-1Y2t+2] (53)
The different consumption possibilities (considered using marginal utilities) as well
as the altruistic parameter have a very important role in the individual’s investment
decision 15.
1 =  [u'(C1t+1)/u'(C1t))d(Y1t+1+ (1+r)-1Y2t+2] (54)
If we assume that u'(C1t+1) = u'(C1t):
1 = d[Y1t+1  + (1+r)-1Y2t+2)] (55)
This condition contrasts with the NPV criterion, where a constant time discount is
applied without considering who enjoys the flows of consumption. The NPV states that the
investment is profitable if the benefits are higher than the costs, which are both only
weighted using the time discount factor. In this case, according to the NPV, it is profitable
to invest until the next equality is achieved:
1 = (1+r)-1Y1t+1+ (1+r)-2Y2t+2 (56)
In the investment under consideration, if d > (1+r)-1 then the optimal decision of the
individual in the presence of altruism is more generous to the heir than the NPV criterion.
Taking into account that each period represents half of an individual’s life span, it is not
very daring to think that (1+r)-1 is lower than d.
The social maximization program is:
Max (1+d)Vt + (d+d2) Vt+1 s.t. (50) and (51)
                                                
15 The condition can also be expressed in function of the marginal utilities of consumption for the first period
of life as we assume that the allocation of consumption along the life-span follows the optimality condition
(41).
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bt
The investor’s consumption appears twice because it affects the utility of his/her
parent (dVt), an older individual at the time the investment started. The consumption of the
heir appears with two weights, one for the investor (dVt+1) and other for the investor’s
parent (d2Vt+1) consideration. The valuation of the consumption of the ascendant of the
generation t-1 (Vt-1) is not included in the program because it is not directly affected by this
investment.
First order condition with respect to bt:
(1+d)u'(C1t) = (1+d)d[u'(C1t+1)Y1t+1  + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+2)Y2t+2] (57)
u'(C1t) = d[u'(C1t+1)Y1t+1  + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+2)Y2t+2] (58)
The investment condition is identical to (52), so in this case, social and individual optimal
levels of investment are the same and both differ from the NPV.
In this second case we have seen that even when a structure of overlapping
generations and altruistic considerations is included in the analysis, it may be that
individual and social optima of intergenerational projects are the same. However, it is not
legitimate to generalize this result and to assert that social and individual optima are always
the same, and even less so to assert that methods (such as the NPV), which only consider
the flows of consumption by the time discount of present generations, lead to optimal
decisions regarding the level of intergenerational investment, as some authors do with
similar models16. In the investment in this example, the negative effect that the decrease in
the consumption of the investor has on his/her ascendant (an individual present in today’s
society) compensates for the positive effect caused by the consumption of the heir of the
investor (first future generation) in the social welfare function.
The result of this second case is due to the particular characteristics of the
investment under consideration, but it cannot be generalized to all intergenerational
investments. In fact, one of the main results of incorporating different generations and
intergenerational altruism in the analysis is the divergence that might arise between social
and individual optimal levels of intergenerational investments, as we have previously seen.
6.2.4. Investment of an old individual that yields benefits to his/her grandchild, member
of the first future generation
In the previous case, an investment taken by a young individual benefited his/her
heir. Let us assume now that it is the old individual in t (generation t-1) who undertakes the
investment enjoyed by his/her grandchild.
If the other circumstances are unchanged, the budget constraints of the investor in
generation t-1 are as follows:
C1t-1 = wt-1 - st-1 + Y1t-1(bt-2) (first period constraint) (59)
C2t = (1+r)st-1 - bt + Y2t(bt-2) (second period constraint) (60)
where bt is the investment that the individual of generation t-1 gives to his/her grandchild,
member of generation t+1; Y1t-1(bt-2) and Y2t(bt-2) are the flows of consumption from the
investment that the individual receives from his/her grandparent. The investment bt yields
the flows Y1t+1(bt-2) and Y2t+2(bt) consumed by the grandchild of the investor.
The maximization program of the individual of generation t-1 is:
                                                
16 See e.g. Hultkrantz (1992), who identifies the social welfare function with the utility function of one
member of the present generation, ignoring the point of view of the other present individuals. This leads, of
course, to the coincidence between the social and the individual optimal investments considered in his work.
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Max Vt-1  + d Vt + d2Vt+1 s.t. (59) and (60)
bt, st
The project only modifies the consumption of the investor and his/her descendant of
future generation t+1. We can thus obviate the valuation of the consumption of the
descendant of generation t (d Vt) as well as the valuation of the consumption of the other
descendants.
First order condition with respect to bt :
(1+s)-1u'(C2t) = d2 [u'(C1t+1)Y1t+1 + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+2)Y2t+2] (61)
The savings condition (41) does not change. Combining it with (61) we obtain:
(1+r)-1u'(C1t-1) = u'(C1t+1)d2[Y1t+1 + (1+r)-1Y2t+2] (62)
1 =  Hd2[Y1t+1  + (1+r)-1Y2t+2] (63)
Where H = [u'(C1t+1)(1+r))/u'(C1t-1)]
Again, we obtain a condition depending on both the different marginal utilities of
consumption and the altruistic parameter d, which shows the positive effect of the
descendant (grandchild) on the welfare of the investor. It is easy to see that this condition
differs from the NPV. According to the NPV criterion, it is optimal to invest up to the point
that the next equality is achieved:
1 =  (1+r)-1 Y1t+1 + (1+r)-2Y2t+2 (64)
where the weights given to the different consumption flows do not consider who
enjoy them but only when are they enjoyed.
The social maximization program is:
Max Vt-1  + (d + d2) Vt+1 s.t. (59) and (60)
bt
The weight given to the consumption of the descendant of generation t+1 is higher
than in the individual program. This is because both the consideration by the parent (dVt+1)
and the grandparent (d2Vt+1) are included in the social valuation. Both of them are present
in the society taking the decision and are thus part of the social welfare function.
First order condition with respect to bt:
(1+s)-1u'(C2t) = (1+d)d[u'(C1t+1)Y1t+1 + (1+s)-1u'(C2t+2)Y2t+2] (65)
If we introduce the savings condition (41) we get:
(1+r)-1 u'(C1t-1) = u'(C1t+1)(1+d)d[Y1t+1  + (1+r)-1Y2t+2] (66)
1 =  H(1+d)d[Y1t+1  + (1+r)-1Y2t+2] (67)
In the condition of the individual optimal level of investment (63) the weight given
to the consumption of the individual of future generation t+1 with respect to the weight
given to the sacrifice of an additional unit by the individual of generation t-1 was Hd2. In
the social case (67) this weight is clearly higher, H(1+d)d. This is due to the fact that in the
social valuation, the effects that the project causes on the utilities of all present individuals
are included and not only the effects on the utility of the investor, as occurs in the
individual case.
In general, the optimal social decision with respect to the level of intergenerational
investment derived from a social welfare function including altruism is more generous to
future generations than the optimal decision from the individual point of view.
Furthermore, both of them differ from the NPV and very probably give more weight to
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consumption by future generations17 because the positive influences of their consumption
on the utility of their ascendants present in current society are taken into account. However,
the NPV only considers the future through an arbitrary extension of the time preferences of
present generations, thereby applying a negligible weight to future flows of consumption.
It is not necessary to repeat the entire analysis to affirm that the divergence is larger
in the case of public goods, where the difference between the effects taken into account by
an individual and the effects that enter into the social consideration are much larger.
6. 3. Some comments on optimality in intergenerational investments
The use of an overlapping generations model has allowed us to introduce the
existence of different generations and the interrelationships between their welfare,
including altruistic preferences, into the analysis. We have thus been able to consider the
problem of intergenerational allocation without avoiding the issue of the individuals’
intertemporal allocation of consumption, as do most studies on the subject. Both issues are
part of the intertemporal allocation of resources and must be taken into account in order to
perform an appropriate analysis of it.
After considering different generations and intergenerational altruism, we have
concluded that the optimal decisions of investment derived from individual and social
preferences imply some factors that are not taken into account in usual calculations. Both in
the individual and social decisions, the weight given to each consumption depends on who
receives it and not only on the time discount of present generations, as is the case with
conventional methods such as the NPV. Under the conditions of optimality derived in this
section, the time discounting for the different flows of consumption is applied from the
point of view of the individuals who receive them. These valuations are then weighted
according to how they affect individual or social welfare, taking into account the altruistic
preferences of individuals.
The optimal social decision regarding intergenerational investments is generally
more generous with future generations than the individual one. This is due to the fact that in
social decisions, all the effects that investments have on the utilities of the individuals
within society are taken into account, and not only the effects on investors. Furthermore,
both are very likely to be more favorable to future generations than conventional methods
such as the NPV. These methods take into account all the flows of consumption, applying
only the time discounting of present individuals and thus they ignore intergenerational
allocation. It seems appropriate to modify the investment management and evaluation
methods usually applied in intergenerational issues, as is the case with many environmental
projects. In this regard, the application of the MGNPV proposed in the previous section
would lead to the weighting of future consumption, taking into account the preferences
regarding the consumption of future generations. This will help to avoid the negligible
weight usually given to future generations. The application of conventional discounting is
misleading with regard to the true preferences of society and could lead to investment well
below the optimal level in many environmental and infrastructure projects.
7. CONCLUSION
                                                
17 In this specific case, assuming that the different generations have the same marginal utility of consumption,
this is true if (1+d)d is higher than (1+r)-1.
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The set of economic instruments for internalizing externalities and providing
collective goods are effective to a more or less satisfactory extent for solving the
environmental problems affecting present generations. However, these instruments are
inappropriate for considering the externalities that present generations cause to future
generations and for preserving intergenerational goods.
Obviously, if the world ended with present generations, problems such as climate
change or the loss of biodiversity would merit much less attention. The reason for this is
simple - the costs to present generations are relatively small, while it is to be expected that
they are very important for future generations.
It should be noted that a necessary condition for internalizing intergenerational
externalities is to have a system which allows future generations to have a part of the
property rights and to be able to manage and negotiate with them without any limitations
other than those governing the behavior of the present generation. For the moment, there is
no institution which could transfer property rights to future generations. Efforts towards
environmental management according to conventional economic theory therefore only
work to the benefit of the present generation, in as far as they do not consider the interests
of future generations.
This is an economic problem, but only in part, because any solution to it requires a
new institutional framework. It is necessary to create new institutions which allow future
generations to
a) Have their rights over natural resources and the environment recognized.
b) Be able to negotiate their property rights in the market with the same rights and
possibilities as present generations.
c) Have access to administrative and law systems
d) Have a voice and vote in the political system.
To conclude, we feel that the main problem is the conflict of interests between
present and future generations. The consequences of this conflict from a distributive
perspective have been studied (see e.g. Lind, 1995) However, the impact from an allocative
point of view have been studied to a lesser extent 18 and for this reason, we have devoted
the second part of our study to this important problem.
Research has focused on the search for a satisfactory solution to the consideration of
future generations in project and policy appraisal. Conventional cost-benefit analysis loses
its legitimacy in the intergenerational context. An appropriate treatment of intergenerational
problems needs to overcome the strong limitations of conventional economic analysis, such
as the very unequal distribution of rights or the infinite substitution possibilities it assumes.
The paper has presented an alternative evaluation process consistent with the sustainability
requirement in which the right of future generations to enjoy a non-diminished resource
capacity is recognized. The consideration of preferences over the consumption of future
generations has led us to recommend a new valuation method, the multigenerational net
present value, for considering the impact on each generation by means of the correct
intergenerational weight. Finally, analysis of various possibilities for intergenerational
investments has shown that conventional methods do not take into account preferences for
the consumption of future generations in an appropriate manner, which reinforces the need
                                                
18 In Pasqual and Souto (2003) the relationships between present and future generations are analyzed, taking
into account both the distributive and the allocative effects.
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to apply the new methods in order to consider the consumption flows in each generation
adequately.
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